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On June 5, 2025, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously ruled in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services that plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are not subject to a heightened evidentiary threshold based on their majority-group status. Specifically, this ruling eliminates the “background circumstances” requirement that several federal appellate courts previously had crafted and imposed on majority-group plaintiffs, reinforcing the principle that Title VII protects individuals equally, regardless of whether they are part of a majority or minority group.
Background on Ames
Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, brought a Title VII sex discrimination claim against her employer, the Ohio Department of Youth Services (the “Agency”), when it allegedly denied her a promotion and later demoted her in favor of less-qualified LGBTQ+ candidates. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to the Agency, relying on Sixth Circuit precedent that required Ms. Ames, a so-called “reverse discrimination” plaintiff, to show “background circumstances” suggesting that the Agency was an unusual employer inclined to discriminate against members of a majority group. Without that evidence, the district court decided that Ms. Ames failed to show that the Agency acted with a discriminatory motive, as required under the burden-shifting framework used in Title VII cases.1 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit then affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Supreme Court’s Rejection of Crafted Standards for Majority-Group Plaintiffs
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of Ms. Ames’ claims and held that Title VII does not impose a higher burden on certain plaintiffs based on their group identity. Writing for the Court, Justice Ketanji Brown-Jackson explained that requiring additional “background circumstances” evidence from majority-group employees is inconsistent with the plain language of Title VII, which protects “any individual” from discrimination, making no distinction between members of majority and minority groups. Justice Brown-Jackson also noted prior decisions recognizing that “[d]iscriminatory preference[s] for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed” in Title VII.2
The Court also explained that the “background circumstances” requirement is incompatible with Title VII’s flexible evidentiary approach. The Court reiterated that the type of proof needed to support a discrimination claim can vary based on the facts presented and that a rigid structure of proof was never intended to limit a plaintiff’s means of proof. By requiring a particular kind of showing from majority-group plaintiffs at the outset, the “background circumstances” rule effectively short circuits Title VII’s intent.
In a separate concurrence, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, noted the difficulty of determining who qualifies as a member of a “majority group,” observing that such classifications can vary depending on the context. Justice Thomas’ concurrence also signaled a potential future challenge on the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework that courts have used since 1973 to review Title VII and other discrimination claims, particularly on summary judgment. This kind of warning sign for the McDonnell Douglas framework is notable because the framework was not at issue in Ames.
Specific to the case at hand, the Court did not decide whether Ms. Ames had presented enough evidence to move forward under the standard Title VII framework. Instead, the Court’s decision was limited to rejecting the “background circumstances” rule as a threshold requirement.
Key Takeaways for Employers
The Ames decision reinforces the notion that employers will be scrutinized heavily if they attempt to give preferences to minority group candidates and employees with respect to any employment-related decision. While the idea that Title VII applies equally to all persons is not controversial, employers need to continue to be mindful of the increasing threat from majority-group plaintiff claims, particularly in the current political climate where attacks on DEI and related programs are so public. Stated differently, historical notions of “doing good” by attempting to elevate minority group candidates are likely to lead to legal challenges that are going to be facially viable under Ames. Employers accordingly should continue to ensure that their hiring, promotion, and disciplinary decisions are neutral and are supported by clear, consistent documentation tied to legitimate business reasons.
If you have any questions regarding the Ames decision or how it may affect your employment practices, please contact any member of the AGG Employment practice.
[1] See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
[2] Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).