A recent Second Circuit case highlights the potential perils of basing employment decisions upon subjective judgments which are susceptible to multiple interpretations. In Abrams v. Department of Public Safety, the court reversed a summary judgment decision granted to an employer based upon the hiring supervisor’s assessment that a non-minority applicant for a detective position in a special major crimes group would "fit in better" than a minority applicant for that position.
The minority detective, Frederick Abrams, brought a variety of discrimination and retaliation claims against a state law enforcement agency based upon his non-selection for a major crimes unit position and his subsequent reassignment to a casino unit following his internal complaints about not receiving the major crimes job and various other things. The district court granted the law enforcement agency’s motion for summary judgment on Abrams’ discrimination claims, but found that there were sufficient questions of fact surrounding the retaliation claim to warrant those claims proceeding to trial. In granting the summary judgment motion, the district court refused to consider the "fit in better" comment, finding that it was an inadmissible hearsay statement. Abrams appealed to the Second Circuit after a jury ruled in favor of the law enforcement agency following a three-day trial.
On appeal, the Second Circuit ruled that the lower court had improperly excluded the "fit in better" statement, finding that it was not hearsay and was admissible evidence. The court explained that this statement was not being offered to establish its truth – that Abrams would not be a good fit – but rather only to show that the statement was made and that it referred to Abrams.
The central question, the court observed, was whether this racially neutral statement was sufficient to create an inference of discrimination sufficient to avoid summary judgment. Relying on an earlier Fifth Circuit decision, the Second Circuit noted:
"[T]he phrasing "better fit" or "fitting in" just might have been about race; and when construing the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, those phrases, even when isolated, could be enough to create a reasonable question of fact for a jury. It is enough of an ambiguity to create a reasonable question of fact."
The case was therefore remanded to the district court for further proceedings and perhaps a second trial.
This case plainly illustrates the vulnerability of employment decisions based upon ambiguous, subjective judgments and shows the ease with which these decisions can be attacked and challenged, even on appeal. Because of the conflicting inferences that can be drawn from these judgments, employers are obviously well-served to base their employment decisions upon consistent, measurable, job-related criteria whenever possible.